Marketing researchers have used models of consumer demand to forecast future sales; to describe and test theories of behavior; and to measure the response to marketing interventions. The basic framework typically starts from microfoundations of expected utility theory to obtain an econometric system that describes consumers' choices over available options, and to thus characterize product demand. The basic framework has been augmented signicantly to account for quantity choices; to accommodate purchases of several products on a single purchase occasion (multiple discreteness and multi-category purchases); and to allow for asymmetric switching between brands across dierent price tiers. These extensions have enabled researchers to bring the analysis to bear on several related marketing phenomena of interest. This paper has three main objectives. The rst objective is to articulate the main goals of demand analysis forecasting, measurement and testing and to highlight several considerations associated with these goals. Our second objective is describe the main building blocks of individual-level demand models. We discuss approaches built on direct and indirect utility specications of demand systems, and review extensions that have appeared in the Marketing literature. The third objective is to explore a few emerging directions in demand analysis including considering demand-side dynamics; combining purchase data with primary information; and using semiparametric and nonparametric approaches. We hope researchers new to this literature will take away a broader perspective on these models and see potential for new directions in future research.
You can never foretell what any one man will do, but you can say with precision what an average number will be up to. Individuals vary, but percentages remain constant. So says the statistician.
The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes, The sign of four Demand analysis plays a more central role in Marketing than perhaps any other eld in the social sciences. Normatively, models of demand are used to forecast the eect of marketing interventions, and to prescribe the implementation of better policies that increase the prots of rms or improve the welfare of consumers. Positively, models of demand are used to test theories of consumer response and to quantify the eects of Marketing in competitive environments. The proliferation of data, contexts and motivations has now resulted in large classes of demand models, diering both in their properties and in their intended use. This paper summarizes some of the recent developments in demand analysis in Marketing, focusing specically on the goals underlying the use of these models, and the microfoundations on which they are based. An important theme of the paper is to articulate the considerations that shape the nature of the model used and constrains the scope of the analysis using those models. Our objective is not to provide an exhaustive survey of demand models that have appeared in the Marketing literature. Rather, our focus is on the building blocks of these demand models along with some ways in which the models have been augmented to study aspects of consumer purchase behavior that are of interest to marketers. We mostly focus attention on discrete-choice models of demand in posted-price environments. We also highlight the rich tradition in the eld of sophisticated, individual-level models of consumer behavior, which form a foil to the recent interest in aggregate demand systems in the tradition of Berry et al. (1995) . In keeping with the goals of this issue, the paper is targeted primarily at doctoral students and at researchers new to this literature.
Some understanding of utility theory and econometric issues is presumed.
We divide the paper into three broad sections. In the rst section, our focus is on the main goals of demand analysis forecasting, measurement and testing. We emphasize how these goals drive the choice of a particular demand specication. In section two, we focus on the microfoundations of discretechoice demand and discuss the two broad approaches to building demand models an indirect utility approach and a direct utility approach. We discuss extensions including discrete/continuous demand systems, models of multiple-discreteness, multi-category models, and non-homothetic demand systems that incorporate income eects. In section three, we provide a brief look at emerging directions in demand analysis and discuss current topics of interest. These include the consideration of dynamics in demand, the recent trend towards enhancing demand models with primary data and the interest in exible, nonparametric approaches. The nal section concludes.
What determines model-form ?
One of the strengths of the Marketing eld is its interdisciplinary nature, incorporating ideas from microeconomics, psychology, statistics, and sociology. A consequence has been a rich proliferation of models, approaches and philosophies to understanding consumer behavior, and in particular, to modeling consumer demand. One theme of this paper is to discuss the considerations that determine the choice of consumer demand models, and to discuss which model works under what circumstance. We organize our discussion of model-form around three typical goals of demand analysis, viz. forecasting, measurement, and testing. We argue that model-form should be determined by the goal of the analysis and the feasibility of identication using available data.
Demand forecasts are important to rms for predicting future sales, for inventory planning, and for understanding the prot consequences of potential marketing strategies. Hence, demand-systems are frequently embedded in rms' decision-support systems and forecasting is of interest to researchers per se. When the goal of the analysis is forecasting demand in relatively stable environments, the best option is a descriptive model. By a stable environment, we mean the counterfactual policies for which forecasts are sought have been observed in the data (or at least, the counterfactual policies are in the neighborhood of the policies observed in the data). For example, this may include forecasting how sales will evolve in the future if the rm continued to use the same pricing policy as it has in the data. Forecasts of sales under small changes around observed prices in the data also t the stable environment description, but a radical departure in the pricing policy would not. By a descriptive model, we mean one that exibly and parsimoniously captures the across-unit demand relationships in the data, without being concerned about causality. For example, if forecasting across time is the main goal of model-building, an approach in which sales are modeled as exible functions of current sales drivers and past history own and competing sales, prices, and other marketing mix variables would be termed descriptive. The model builder in this exercise focuses on using all variables available to the rm today to best forecast outcomes for the future. An emphasis on measuring the causal eect of history (or any other variable) on current or future outcomes is immaterial to such an exercise, and to insist on this may result in a worse-performing model. (Bass 1969) , which model current sales as a function of past cumulative sales. Examples for individual-level data include discrete-choice models incorporating Guadagni and Little-style functions of past purchase history (Guadagni and Little 1983) . Such models perform impressively for forecasting aggregate or individual outcomes respectively. The main concern for model-building in this class of models is parsimony, and an emphasis on avoiding overtting in-sample. Overtting has the potential to signicantly impinge on the model's out-of-sample forecasting ability. Overtting considerations can be addressed by imposing informative structure (e.g., Montgomery and Rossi, 1999's notion of using theory as a Bayesian prior), or via the use of model selection criteria that penalize parameter proliferation (e.g. use of marginal likelihoods or Bayes' factors).
Descriptive models are indexed by policy-specic parameters, and are unsuitable for forecasting the eects of radically dierent counterfactuals which have not been observed in the data. Intuitively, demand equations are a function of the interaction of underlying buyer behavior with a policy environment. In stable environments the demand parameters that occur from this interaction are xed; but in a radically dierent environment, the parameters cannot be logically considered unchanged when the policy environment changes. For example, consumer beliefs about future prices change signicantly when a rm moves its pricing policy from a Hi-Lo regime to an EDLP (Every Day Low Price) regime.
The parameters of a descriptive model of demand estimated on data from the Hi-Lo regime are functions of these beliefs; hence, these cannot logically be held xed in forecasting the move to EDLP.
The promise of structural models, derived from theoretical microfoundations of consumer behavior, is built on the premise that these counterfactuals can be more credibly simulated by re-solving the model explicitly for agent's policies given estimates of policy-invariant parameters that index primi-1 For e.g., a causal analysis may necessitate not using the full variation in past history on account of the fact it is endogenous to current outcomes; nding exogenous sources of variation in history will help identify causality, but this will almost surely result in a poorer t relative to a model that exploits all the variation in past history; thereby reducing forecasing ability.
tive consumer preferences (see Chintagunta et al. 2006 ; Reiss and Wolak 2007 for recent discussions).
Essentially, the approach involves estimating deep parameters indexing consumer behavior, and then building up to a new demand structure under the counterfactual conditional on these primitives. In some sense, the models use theory to navigate the unknown, and in several contexts have been shown to provide surprisingly good predictions of radically dierent counterfactuals and underlying primitives.
2 In addition, the recourse to a theory of underlying behavior implies the model has a causal interpretation. The main concern for model building in this class of models is to nd the right match between the theory, the data, and the econometric specication. This is a signicantly challenging endeavor. A good structural model will need to demonstrate the theory, combined with the chosen econometric specication, can explain key patterns in-sample, to convince the reader of the credibility of the reported out-of-sample predictions.
A second goal of demand analysis is measurement. Erdem et al. 2000) . If this is the goal, a structural model of demand that incorporates a theory of consumer choice, and claries the consumer's information sets, beliefs and preferences may be required to be take to demand data.
If, on the other hand, the only goal is to measure causal eects as cleanly as possible from the data, the right model is one that imposes minimal structure. Essentially, we want the data, and not the functional form assumptions of the model, to drive the estimated eect. The ideal option then is to be able to run an experiment, where the treatment (e.g. marketing intervention) is randomly assigned to treated and control groups. Randomization solves two problems endemic to empirical work: a) it removes the criticism that results are driven by model structure, and, b) it provides exogenous variation to measure the causal eects of the treatment. The exogneous variation helps address the endogeneity induced by the codetermination of marketing variables with demand, and by potential targeting of marketing interventions by the rm. While attractive, randomization is not necessarily a replacement for models. The experimental approach is often costly to run (or infeasible, in some cases), and provides only local average treatment eects. It also typically provides only summary measures (like the mean) of the distribution of Marketing treatments. For modeling distributional eects, a full model may be required, especially when treatment eects are heterogeneous. Even in lab-settings, where randomization is less dicult to achieve, combining the experiment with a model of behavior is useful for inference of heterogeneous eects, and to facilitate a less onerous and more ecient research design (e.g., Lenk,
DeSarbo, Green and Young 1996). In the absence of an experiment, a researcher wishing to measure causal eects is forced to confront the twin challenges of identication: nding the right variation to measure the eect of interest, and assuring that the eect is driven by the data and not completely by functional-form assumptions.
Nonparametric models of demand, when combined with sources of exogenous variation, can address issues related to functional form and non-random variation. As examples, consider a common marketing This literature is often referred to as the reduced-form, causal-eects class due to its emphasis on measuring causal eects with minimal assumptions. Reduced-form, causal-eects approaches are contrasted with descriptive models that measure correlations between variables, and are therefore not concerned with causality. Hence, nding sources of exogenous variation is not a concern in using descriptive models for the goal of forecasing in stable environments. However, once the goals of the exercise are expanded beyond forecasting, the considerations outlined above will apply to descriptive approaches as well. Our discussion above highlights the roles of dierent classes of demand models descriptive models for forecasting in stable environments; structural models when the interest is in forecasting the eects of radically dierent counterfactuals; structural models and reduced-form, causal eects models for measurement; and reduced-form, causal eects models for testing. An important theme is the role of structure. Structure serves to generate parsimony in model specication, and guide the specication of relationships between the various moving pieces of the model. However, as we have tried to clarify above, the extent of theory imposed depends on the goals of the analysis and the features of its intended use. Finally, in empirical models, theory typically species only a set of relationships amongst variables.
The quantitative strength of the relationship is indexed by parameters which will be estimated. What parameters can be estimated is constrained by the nature of the variation in the data. Thus, the available variation also constrains the scope of the structure that can be incorporated into the model. This is the identication problem (discussed in more detail in Misra 2011, accompanying article).
We close this section discussing the interaction of supply-side issues in demand analysis. In equilibrium, demand, prices, advertising and other marketing-mix allocations are co-determined, and hence, marketing factors are econometrically endogenous in empirical demand systems. Accounting for the endogeneity is critical to a credible estimation of the demand curve. The endogeneity can be addressed by nding some source of exogenous variation in the demand-supply system. In some situations, one option to address the co-determination is to impose restrictions from an assumed model of supply (e.g. Some may criticize this view as schizophrenic: we seem to be advocating using strong assumptions like utility maximization for estimating consumer-level models, but not for rms; it would seem rms in competitive industries have more incentives to make economically rational decisions than consumers.
Our response is that as an empirical matter, our models seem to be able to do a better job explaining demand data than supply data. The demand systems Marketing empiricists routinely use t the data well, and also perform impressively out of sample. However, evidence of the reliable out-of-sample performance of supply-side models has been scarce in the literature (this is indeed an area where more empirical work would be welcome). It is also hard to reconcile static supply-side models with key features of rm-side variables: examples include the observed persistence of weekly prices (which requires solving an intertemporal price discrimination problem on the supply-side with price-cycles), or the non-random stocking of specic SKU-s across stores (which involves solving an oligopolistic, product-line choice problem with sunk costs and dynamics). Further, rms often care about longterm outcomes; CEO-s routinely value market share in addition to prots; and marketing managers respond to career concerns and agency issues. These suggest marketing mix allocation in competitive markets are complex, dynamic phenomena, that may not be well approximated by simple, static models of supply. Unlike demand, which typically involves a single-agent model, credible supply-side models that can capture these phenomena are multi-agent, dynamic systems encompassing multiple incentives, which are harder to test, estimate and validate, especially given current data and computing power.
The rest of the paper is concerned largely with the specication of models of demand built on an underlying theory of consumer utility-maximization. The derivation from an underlying model of utility helps clarify the role served by structure, the restrictions imposed by the theory, and how economic models can be converted to econometric specications by incorporating stochastic elements. In the next section, we provide a short review of the microfoundations of the workhorse discrete-choice demand systems popular in Marketing. Such demand systems form the basic building blocks of understanding individual-level purchase behavior since much of micro data in Marketing involve consumers choosing from a xed set of alternatives within a category. We discuss two approaches to building up the model from rst principles, one starting from the direct utility function, and the other with the indirect utility function.
Marketing Models of Demand
The discussion below is motivated by ve distinguishing aspects of the demand literature in Marketing.
First, the Marketing literature emphasizes the disaggregate analysis of demand at the brand, product, or SKU-level, as this is the relevant unit of analysis for rms. At this level of disaggregation, demand at the individual consumer level is lumpy, featuring many zeros (corner solutions), and quantities purchased are discrete. Consequently, discrete choice models of demand that accommodate the proliferation of zeros, augmented to allow for quantity choices have ourished in Marketing.
3 Second, since its earliest days, Marketing models of demand typically accommodate dierentiated products, treating both branding and attribute dierences as sources of product dierentiation. Third, empirical work on demand has a strong emphasis on heterogeneity, focused on uncovering dierences across consumers that facilitate targeting and discrimination. As noted by Allenby and Rossi (1999) , this emphasis diers from much of the econometric literature, which regards heterogeneity as nuisance parameters to be integrated out of the objective function. In contrast, the uncovering of heterogeneity is often the object of inference in several studies of demand. Further, a robust nding across marketing datasets is the fact that observationally equivalent consumers tend to exhibit signicantly diering patterns of behavior. This had led to a sustaining emphasis in Marketing on allowing for unobserved heterogeneity. The demand literature in Marketing thus leads in the development and adoption of methods for parsimoniously and exibly accommodating heterogeneity. We will not separately address the issue of unobserved heterogeneity in this paper. Rather, the formulations of all the models we discuss will account for such heterogeneity. To emphasize these ve features, much of the work we review below has a strong link to an underlying theory of consumer optimization; involves discrete choice models of dierent products; accommodates the informational content of quantity choices; allows for rich observed unobserved heterogeneity;
and utilizes individual-level data. We point the reader to the reviews by Dubé et al. 
Microfoundations: Two Approaches
Utility-theoretic approaches to demand analysis in Marketing has taken two related but distinct approaches. The rst involves deriving demand from the specication of an indirect utility function, which by Roy's identity (Roy 1952), yields Marshallian demand functions. The other approach starts with the direct utility function, and derives demand from the optimality or Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions associated with the maximization problem. We discuss both approaches in sequence focusing on the main workhorse approaches in both literatures. Our goal is also to clarify the consequences of assumptions about preferences so that reasonable restrictions can be used to generate specications for empirical work, while unreasonable ones can be avoided. Basic Setup The goal of the theory is to describe demand for a basket of goods, x = (x 1 , .., x J ) when facing prices, p = (p 1 , .., p J ). It is typical to also include an outside good, z. The outside good represents that part of total income, y, spend on all goods other than the J inside goods.
Econometrically, specication of the outside good in the demand function is important to allow for total category demand to respond to net changes in prices, and in discrete choice models, is equivalent to including a no purchase option.
5 The direct utility is specied over the demands as u (x 1 , .., x J , z).
With linear pricing, the budget constraint is x · p + z = y. 6 As u(.) is increasing, the consumer will spend all his income, and buy at least one good. By construction, we choose z as the essential good:
demand for the outside good is strictly positive. In this interpretation, the budget constraint is binding at the optimum. The consumer chooses demand by solving,
Prices aect choices only through the budget constraint. This is the main aspect that imposes restrictions on the specication of utility-consistent demand functions. 
Indirect Utility Approach
The indirect utility approach is attractive because it avoids having to derive demand as the solution to the complicated nonlinear optimization problem in Equation (1) . The indirect utility is a function of prices and expenditure and is obtained by substituting the optimal demands, (x * , z * ) into u(.),
The researcher starts by picking a specication of v(p, y), and then obtains the implied Marshallian
Demand functions via Roy's identity,
Elasticities are biased in the absence of a no-purchase option, a point illustrated in Chintagunta (1993).
6 With nonlinear prices, we can write the budget constraint as, x · p(x) +z = y. See Hausman (1985) for an early application. The chosen indirect utility function corresponds to some direct utility function, which is typically not the object of interest. Access to the indirect utility function is sucient for computing metrics of economic interest like compensating variation.
8 An alternative equivalent approach is to start directly with the specication of the Marshallian demand functions, (x * (p, y), z * (p, y)), and to treat Roy's Identity as a dierential equation equation to solve for the implied v(p, y) (see Dubin and McFadden, 1984 for this approach).
The main details for taking this model to Marketing data involve allowing for corner solutions to accommodate discrete choice, allowing for product dierentiation, and the specication of stochastic terms to produce an econometric specication. The typical approach follows the model of Hanemann 
Here, ψ j (> 0) are weights reecting the consumer's perceived quality of brand j. Maximization of Equation (2) subject to a linear budget constraint results in a corner solution in which at most one brand is purchased. This will be the case whenever indierence curves between any two pairs of products are linear or concave. Then, the indierence curve corresponding to maximal utility will intersect the budget constraint at one of the axes. Product dierentiation is accommodated by allowing the weights ψ j to be a function of brand attributes w j and consumer i's tastes for attributes β i . Stochastic errors = ( 1 , .., J , z ) enter the model via the weights, reecting the econometrician's uncertainty regarding subjective brand evaluations. A popular specication is,
which guarantees the positivity of the weights. Consistent with a random utility formulation, the consumer is assumed to observe the realization of prior to making purchase. From the perspective of the econometrician, ψ j has a distribution induced by the distribution of , F ψ (ψ 1 , .., ψ J , ψ z ), which generates a likelihood for the data. The Lagrangian for the problem is,
with the non-negativity constraints, (x, z) ≥ 0. The key for corner solutions is to recognize that some non-negativity constraints, x ≥ 0, will bind as equalities. The solution satisfy the KKT conditions,
There are two possible outcomes: no-purchase, or purchase of one of the inside goods.
No Purchase If the consumer chooses not to purchase any of the inside goods, the bundle (0, .., 0, z * )
is optimal. The KKT conditions imply that for this bundle to be optimal, we need,
where, u 1 (.) and u 2 (.) are the derivatives of u with respect to its rst and second arguments respectively.
We can interpret Equation (3) as follows. When x * j = 0 is optimal, complementary slackness implies the rst-order conditions for x j , j = 1, .., J are inequalities; when z * > 0 is also optimal, complementary slackness implies the rst-order conditions for z is binding as an equality (if z is positive, requiring z × ∂L /∂z = 0 implies ∂L /∂z = 0). Equation (3) implies that no-purchase will occur when all the qualityweighted prices,
Intuitively, no brand has a quality weighted price that is low enough to induce purchase. Terming the right-hand term, R =
the following condition for no-purchase,
How do we obtain the reservation price while avoiding specifying u(.)? It is easy to see (e.g., Chiang 
One Brand is Chosen If the consumer chooses one of the inside goods, the bundle (0, ., x * j , ., 0, z * )
is optimal. The associated KKT conditions for this bundle to be optimal are,
Following the same logic as above, if j is chosen, it has to be that
for all k = j. Intuitively, conditional on purchase, the brand with the lowest quality weighted price is chosen. Thus, we can write the implied condition for the j th brand to be chosen as,
The associated quantity demanded of brand j is,
For future reference, note it is possible to invert Equation (7) for the quality index of the chosen good,
Under this setup, the consumer follows a simple decision rule. He decides to buy if the minimum quality-weighted price is less than his reservation price. Else, he decides to not purchase in the category and spends the entire budget on the outside good. If he decides to buy, he chooses the brand with the lowest price per unit quality. From the econometrician's perspective, the brand and quantity decisions ow from one integrated utility function, and are aected by the same stochastic element, ψ. This aspect will be important in forming the likelihood of the model.
Likelihood
The likelihood of the model is derived by the induced distribution on choices by the distribution of the quality weights, F ψ (ψ 1 , .., ψ J , ψ z ). For below, we will assume the researcher has picked a functional form for v(.) and has obtained the expressions for the conditional demand x j from Equation (7), and for the reservation price R = R(w, p; β i ) from Equation (5). We now add the index i for consumer and t for time. We present the likelihood rst for a no-purchase observation, and then for an observation in which brand j is chosen.
The likelihood of a no-purchase bundle (0, .., 0, z * it ) can be evaluated from Equation (4) as,
where, f (ψ z ) is the marginal pdf of ψ z . To obtain the likelihood of a bundle (0, ., x * j,it , ., 0, z * it ) in which brand j is chosen, we combine the inversion in Equation (8) with the inequality conditions in Equation
where F j ψ|ψz is the partial of F ψ|ψz with respect to the jth quality index, ψ j , and J is the Jacobian of the transformation from ψ j to x * j in Equation (7). It is common in Marketing to allow for heterogeneity in the underlying parameters of the demand system, and to relate it to observed (e.g., socio-demographics) and unobserved components. Letting d i denote observed socio-demographics for consumer i, heterogeneity is typically specied via random eects with hyper-parameters Θ,
Combining all, letting y ijt be an indicator of whether product j was purchased in period t, and y i0t
an indicator for no-purchase, the overall likelihood for an individual with T i observations is thus, A non-homothetic specication is required for categories in which there are wide dierences in the qualities of the included goods, or for specifying preferences across categories. Descriptive evidence has documented signicant asymmetries in price-response across brands of diering quality tiers (e.g.
Pauwels et al. 2007
). Allowing for non-homothetic specications allows for an income eect that can capture these asymmetries (Allenby and Rossi 1991). As income increases, consumers are likely to allocate a disproportionate share of expenditure to a higher quality brand. Thus, for a high-quality brand, the substitution and income eects go in the same direction; but for a low-quality brand, the income eect goes in the opposite direction to the substitution eect, thus allowing for asymmetric switching.
This can be accommodated in the above framework by choosing a non-homothetic specication for 
Direct Utility Approach
It is simpler to deal direct. The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes, The Adventure of the Sussex Vampire
The Marketing literature has recognized that in some situations, it is simpler to derive the model 9 Homothetic preferences imply that utility can be produced from consumption according to a constant returns to scale technology, i.e., doubling consumption of all goods, doubles utility. Thus, u(τ x) = τ u(x). An indirect utility function corresponding to homothetic preferences has the form, v = b(p)y. Applying Roy's identity,
, which implies changes in y does not shift the relative demands of brands j, k. superior to mutinomial (pick any-J ) models as it enables exploiting quantity information for inference, and facilitates policy analysis by retaining a link to a valid utility function. It is also superior to approaches that treat each brand-quantity combination as a choice alternative, as it prevents parameter proliferation and does not introduce new random utility errors terms into consumer preferences for each potential quantity-option for a given brand. We rst present the framework introduced in Kim et al. 
where, ψ are quality-weights as before. The direct utility function in (9) augments a linear-inconsumption utility function with location (γ) and scale (α) translations. The role of the location translation is to allow for the possibility of corner solutions. To see this, in Figure (1a) we plot the indierence curve and the budget constraint for a two-goods case. For simplicity, we set γ 1 = γ 2 = γ, and α 1 = α 2 = α. When, γ > 0, the indierence curves strike the axis at an angle, allowing for the possibility that the tangency with the budget constraint is at one of the axis. Thus, corner solutions are accommodated. Which brand is selected depends on the relative prices (slope of the budget constraint), and the relative qualities of the products (level of indierence curve). An interior solution where both brands are purchased is also a possibility. Figure (1b) depicts a situation where the location translation parameters γ 1 = γ 2 = 0. Now, the indierence curves are tangent to the axis, and only interior solutions are possible. Thus, allowing for γ allows for mixed discrete-continuous demand.
The role of the scale translation is to allow for satiation, by building in curvature into the utility function. The marginal utility from consumption is ψ j α j (x j + γ j ) α j −1 . When α j = 1, the marginal utility is constant, and there is no satiation. When all α j = 1, j = 1, .., J, (9) collapses to a linear- in-consumption specication, and we go back to the case discussed in (2). Intuitively, when there is no satiation, the consumer spends all his expenditure on one inside good, which is the brand with the lowest price per unit quality,
. When α j < 1, the consumer's marginal utility diminishes with increased consumption. This satiation is a force that pushes him toward multiple-discreteness. Bhat (2008) points out that (9) is a special case of a Box-Cox translation of a CES utility function,
The additional −1 terms inside the sub-utility functions are cardinal normalizations to ensure weak complementarity (Maler 1974), which is an intuitive requirement that the utility from a good j is zero if it is not consumed. The specication (10) ensures this as the sub-utility from brand j equals zero if x j = 0. Bhat notes that when all the scaling parameters, α j → 0, j = 1, .., J and α z → 0, γ j ψ j ln(
When all the γ-s are normalized to 1, (10) collapses to specication similar to Kim et al.,
In practice however, with existing data sets, researchers have found it dicult to estimate the general model (10) with fully specied scale and translation parameters. A choice between the restricted specications above is thus necessary. Each of the specications, (9), (11) or (12) are able to allow for both corner solutions and satiation. Unfortunately, they are not testable against one another with typical purchase data because each can fully rationalize the observed patterns of brand and quantitychoices in a given dataset; so a nonparametric test between the models is not possible. Hence, the choice of one over the other has to be based on the researcher's preference and modeling goals, as well as the nature of the product category. In practice, we expect the rate of satiation of the outside good is likely lower than the inside goods. Further, if the goods are strong substitutes (e.g., avors of the same product), we may expect the rate of satiation across brands may not be too dierent. Then, a model with a common satiation parameter for all the inside goods, and a separate one for the outside good may be a reasonable approximation.
We now discuss how the above model results in a demand system suitable for empirical work. We present the model treatment with Bhat's specication. The derivation for the other utility functions is analogous. To reect empirical work, stochastic elements and characteristics are introduced into the model in the same fashion as before, by parametrzing the baseline utility as ψ j = exp(w j β i + j ) and ψ z = exp( z ). We can write the Lagrangian for the consumer's problem as:
with the non-negativity constraints, (x, z) ≥ 0.
Following the same approach as outlined before, the KKT conditions corresponding to a bundle (x * 1 , .., x * K , 0, .., 0, z * ) in which K out of the J goods (along with the outside good, which is essential) are bought are:
where, η j = j − z , and,
In writing (13), we have employed the usual procedure of dierencing out the KKT conditions against the equality condition for the essential, outside good. The fact that the budget constraint is binding implies that the demand for one good (say z) is known once the demand for the other J goods are determined, as z * (p, y) = y − x * (p, y) · p. The dierencing reects this unitary reduction in the degrees of freedom for the problem.
Likelihood The likelihood of the model is derived by the distribution induced on choices by the distribution of on the quality weights. Given the assumed joint density on , let f η (η 1 , .., η J ) denote the implied pdf of the error dierences, η. We now add the index i for consumer and t for time. Collect all parameters that are consumer-specic in a vector θ i ≡ (β i , ψ i , γ i , α i ). The likelihood of a bundle (x * 1,it , .., x * K,it , 0, .., 0, z * it ) in which K out of the J goods are bought, and goods (K + 1, .., J) are not bought, is,
where, implicitly (V it , V z,it ) ≡ (V(w, p t ; θ i ), V z (w, p t ; θ i )). J it is the K × K Jacobian matrix with cell (l, m) given by,
The likelihood has two parts, and can be understood as follows. First, for the chosen goods (1, ..K), Equation (13) denes the inverse mapping from the unobservables to demand. Thus, the rst part of the likelihood involves the density of (x * 1,it , .., x * K,it ) given by change-of-variable calculus. This generates the K × K Jacobian J . The second part involves the probability of not purchasing goods (K + 1, .., J).
This is obtained by integrating (η K+1 , .., η J ) over the region consistent with no-purchase as per the KKT inequalities in Equation (13) .
The likelihood dened by Equation (14) is very complicated, and involves integration over a truncated multivariate distribution. This is signicantly challenging for the case of probit specication with normally distributed . Kim 
For the case of Type-1 extreme value distributed , Bhat (2005) shows that the likelihood (13) simplies considerably as,
). This simplifying result facilitates the use of the model for the applied researcher.
Other Approaches The above approach relies on satiation as a force to explain multiple-discreteness.
An alternative approach in Dubé (2004) , explains multiple-discreteness as a form of temporal varietyseeking, wherein a consumer purchases multiple-brands in responses to uncertain future needs (e.g.
Walsh 1995
). Dube's model follows Hendel (1999)'s formulation, and postulates that at the time of purchase, a consumer anticipates he may face N future consumption occasions, and his preferences in consumption occasion n will be θ n . Both N and θ n are deterministic from the perspective of the consumer (i.e. he has no uncertainty about his future needs or tastes), but is stochastic from the perspective of the researcher. This generates a likelihood for the data. Dubé assumes that consumer utility for purchase of J inside goods, and an outside good z is additively separable over the N occasions, and is given as,
subject to an overall budget constraint, n p·x n +z = y. The occasion-specic subutilities are dened over unobserved consumption bundles as, u n (x n ) = ( J j=1 ψ jn x jn ) α , where ψ jn = ψ j (θ n ), are qualityweights for brand j in occasion n. This is similar to the Hanemann formulation in equation (2). Thus, multiple-units of a single alternative will be chosen for each consumption occasion. The separability of the subutilites and the budget constraint ensures that the problem can be solved separately for each consumption occasion, and aggregated to obtain the predicted demand at the purchase stage. Finally, Chan (2005) presents a alternative approach in which utility is specied over characteristics rather than over consumption.
Direct vs. Indirect Utility approaches As the above discussion highlights, the direct and indirect utility approaches to studying individual-level demand share substantial commonality. The main dierence is in how the purchase quantities are characterized. In the former approach, the researcher species a functional form for the direct utility function and obtains the likelihood for purchase quantities directly from the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions. On the other hand, the indirect utility approaches typically species a functional form for the indirect utility function and obtains the purchase quantities from Roy's identity. In our discussion of the indirect utility, discrete/continuous model, we mentioned the use of the Translog indirect utility function to obtain purchase quantities. Such a utility function is consistent with the bivariate direct utility function in Equation (2) . If one wanted to use the direct utility approach to the same problem, one example of a utility function corresponding to Equation (2) would be u(x, z) = ( additional consideration is that under the direct utility approach,the researcher has to compute the corresponding indirect utility in a subsequent maximization step in order to undertake welfare analysis or to measure compensating variation.
On Separability Assumptions
We conclude this section with a discussion of the implications of separability assumptions for the properties of demand derived from the above frameworks. We rst discuss handling complementarity.
Subsequently, we discuss how prices and marketing-mix eects in other categories may be handled when modeling demand for a focal category.
Complementarities
Many Marketing situations involve complementarities. Models with additive utility implicitly assume that all products are substitutes, and cannot allow for complementarities. To see this, suppose utility for goods (1, .., J) is given by the additive structure,
The eect of price k on the compensated demand for good j then has the structure (Deaton & Muelbaueur, 1980),
where µ is a constant. Thus if both j, k are normal goods, it has to be they are substitutes. More restrictive specications, u(x) = u 1 (x 1 )+. . .+u J (x J ), will imply no possibility of interaction from joint consumption, as the marginal utility from consuming one product is unaected by the consumption of others. Demand studies that accommodate complementarities essentially postulate utility specications that relax additivity by allowing for interaction terms between the subutilites of products. For example, Bhat and Pinjari (2010) suggest adding cross-product interactions into the utility function presented in (10) to obtain,
A feature is that when α j → 0, j = 1, .., J (16) Finally, the large literature on state-dependent demand using choice models with lagged dependent variables can be thought of as models with complementary goods where the complementarity is across time.
The Outside Good, and Multiple Categories
The little things are infinitely the most important. The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes, A Case of Identity
One aspect of the discussion so far is that all previous models focused on the J inside goods while ignoring the characteristics and prices of all other goods. These were bundled into an outside option. We close this section with a discussion of the primitive assumptions that justify this focus.
The justication for separating the demand of J inside goods from the overall problem of demand for all N possible goods relies on two dierent forms of separability.
The rst relies on the notion of Hicksian separability, which requires the prices of all other goods, p −J , move in parallel, i.e. p −J = cp −J , where, c is positive, andp −J is a vector of constant base-price levels for the other goods (so relative prices of all goods k / ∈ (1, .., J) always remain the same over time). Dene z = x −J ·p −J , a base prices-weighted average of quantities. z is referred to as the Hicksian composite good. Letũ(.) be the utility function dened over all N possible goods that may be consumed. Then, the solution to the full problem,
is the same as the solution to the simpler problem,
where u(.) is interpreted as the solution to,
Thus, c serves as a price for the composite good z. As the budget constraint does not change if all quantities are scaled (homogeneity of degree 1), we can normalize c to 1 in (17) to give us the standard form (1).
Hicksian separability is an unattractive justication for Marketing studies, as all datasets contradict the fact that relative prices of goods in other categories stay constant over time, or stores. An alternative justication is weak separability of preferences. Assume the utility function is separable in the inside and outside goods as,ũ
where ϑ z (.), is an increasing subtility function. Then, we can think of the customer making a two-stage decision. In the rst stage, he decides how much of total income y to allocate to the inside goods and the outside category. In the second stage, he decides to choose demand for each category conditioning on the expenditure allocation for that category (see Deaton and Muelbauer, 1980 for more on such multilevel budgeting). Denote the expenditure allocated to the outside category as y * . It is clear that the optimal demand for the outside goods is determined by the subproblem,
denote the corresponding indirect utility from spending expenditure y * on the outside goods. Let y * = y(p −J , v * ) be the corresponding cost function. Then, we can write the problem for choosing the inside goods as,
Following Gorman (1959), suppose we can write the expenditure function as,
where a(.) is an increasing function, and b(.) is degree 1 homogeneous in prices. 10 Then, we can write
which is of the form (17). We interpret a(v * ), as a quantity-index and b(p −J ) as a price index. Thus, under weak separability, we interpret the outside good z as v * , the utility from the consumption of all other goods. Whether weak separability is justied for Marketing demand data depends on how categories are dened. Following Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) , weak separability implies that prices or characteristics of any product in the outside good will aect the demand for any inside good only via expenditures (i.e. there is only an income eect). Further, all products in the outside group must be either substitutes or complements to each of the inside goods. Thus, forming an outside good by grouping together two products, one of which is a substitute to one of the inside goods, and the other a complement, is inconsistent with weak separability.
The extant literature has been somewhat informal in its treatment of goods across categories and its analysis of market baskets. Models for multi-category demand have typically taken preference structures originally developed for modeling demand amongst substitutes within a category, and allowed correlation across categories via error terms or correlated parameters. In our view, more work remains to be done in formally deriving multi-category demand systems from a transparent underlying model of expenditure allocation and well-articulated separability assumptions (see e.g., Dreze et al. 2004 ).
New Directions
We discuss three new directions in recent work on demand: dynamics, use of data on unobservables and nonparametric approaches. Again, we reiterate that our aim is not to provide an exhaustive survey of all possible directions but to provide a avor for new demand-side work in Marketing.
Dynamics in Demand
A sophisticated empirical literature in Marketing now explicitly considers dynamic aspects of demand.
The main demand-side factors are storability, durability, experience goods and complementarities. We discuss these briey in sequence.
Storability Storable goods are products that do not perish if not consumed within the same period as they are purchased. Clearly the classication of a product as perishable or storable depends on the length of the time-period considered. For a short-enough time-period, all products are storable.
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Demand under storability is a dynamic problem as current purchase increases inventory, and ceteris 11 Vegetables, Meat and Poultry may be considered perishable if time is dened in weeks, but storable if time is dened in hours. Typical Marketing data are available in discrete-time with calendar time coded in weeks.
paribus, makes the consumer less likely to purchase tomorrow. Understanding the dynamic implications of storability is key to marketers, as it aects the auditing of promotions. Storability implies consumers can stockpile the product during periods of low prices, and consume out of inventory at other times.
If all promotions achieve is to move sales from a high-price future to a low-price present (referred to as purchase acceleration), the sale is essentially losing money. However, if the promotion results in gainful brand switching or increases consumption, it may be benecial. More generally, storability (or any negative state-dependence in demand, e.g. Hartmann 2006 ) implies that demand is subject to intertemporal substitution. Hence, short-run price variation can overstate true price elasticities. In the short-run, buying the product tomorrow is a substitute for buying the product today; hence there are many short-run substitutes to the product bought today. In the long-run, one cannot substitute across time. Hence, long-run demand is less elastic, holding other factors xed.
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Storability can be accommodated in a utility-theoretic model of demand by allowing inventory, i, to be state that shifts utility. Letting x denote per-period consumption; u(x), the per-period utility from consumption; c(i), the cost of carrying inventory i; p j , the current price for product j; and j unobservable (to the econometrician) components of the utility from purchasing product j; we can write the value function from purchase of product j with pack-size q j as,
where the outer max over x indicates that consumption is endogenously chosen, and the future inventory conditional on choosing product j is modeled as i + q j − x, for any chosen x. The key empirical force determining stockpiling will be the specication of expectations over future prices, p .
The empirical problem is complicated by the fact that inventory is a serially correlated unobserved state variable, which increases the computational complexity of the dynamic programing problem. Seiler (2010) to allow for search dynamics.
Durability A durable good is a product that is innitely storable, and hence subject to onetime purchases. Durable good demand is a dynamic problem because purchase today implies the consumer is out of the market tomorrow. Demand for a durable good subject to replacement is modeled similar to that of a storable good by replacing the inventory state by an indicator of the product adopted. Following Melnikov (2000) , durability can be accommodated by allowing whether a product was purchased yesterday y to be a state. Letting p j , w j , the current price and attribute vector for product j; and j , 0 unobservable (to the econometrician) components of the utility from purchasing product j and delaying purchase respectively; we can write the value function from purchase of product j and for delaying purchase (option 0) as,
where w denotes expectations over future attributes. The value functions encapsulate two aspects.
First, purchase of j gives utility α j + ρw j per period forever with present discounted value
This is the implication of durability. Second, delaying purchase has an option value. By delaying, the consumer can make a potentially better decision tomorrow, by choosing to adopt or further wait after observing tomorrow's prices and product sets.
Recent empirical demand systems for durable goods trace their origins to Horsky (1990) and Chatterjee and Eliashberg (1990). More recently, Song and Chintagunta (2003) implemented the formal framework above using data on the purchases of digital cameras. It is now a rich literature, including Experience Goods Experience goods are characterized by ex ante uncertainty about quality, which is resolved by consumption. Demand for experience goods is a dynamic problem because purchase today provides a signal about quality, which updates the future information set. Experience goods can be accommodated by allowing beliefs about product quality to be a state. Letting x j denote the quality of brand j; u j (x j ), the per-period utility from purchasing brand j under the belief that its quality is x j ; b(x) the density of the consumers beliefs about the vector of brand qualities; p j prices; j unobservable (to the econometrician) components of the utility from purchasing product j; we can write the value function from purchase of product j as,
The key force driving the dynamics is that buying product j provides a signal which updates current be- One-way Complementarities One-way complements refer to systems of goods in which a secondary set of goods are purchased only after adoption of a primary good (e.g. razors and blades, consoles and video-games). When the purchase of the secondary good is temporally separated from adoption, this requires augmenting the model to accommodate dynamic considerations arising from the expectations of consumers about future secondary good availability and prices. Demand for such products is dynamic because purchase of the primary good changes the choice set for the consumer tomorrow: by buying an HP printer, the set of cartridge options compatible with HP is added to the choice-set. Demand for one-way complements can be modeled by accommodating the current holdings of the primary good as a state. The primary good is typically treated as durable. Letting p p j , the price for the primary product j; p s k , the price for the secondary product k; Ω a J × 1 vector of indicators denoting the set of primary brands owned; ℵ Ω j the set of secondary products compatible with primary good j; and p , s the vector of unobservables (to the econometrician) to the utility from purchasing the primary and secondary products respectively, we can write the value function from purchase of primary good j as,
The key dynamic here is that purchase of j allows the consumers to buy complementary secondary products from the set ℵ Ω j in the future. The value function for secondary goods is similar to that for a storable goods problem. See Hartmann and Nair (2010) for a dynamic demand system for tied-goods; for dynamic demand for hardware-software systems with indirect network eects.
Enriching Demand Models with Primary Data
It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts. The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes, A Scandal in Bohemia.
An important theme in this paper has been the role of structure and assumptions. Our view is that structure and assumptions are part and parcel of model-building, and researchers have to be comfortable with the fact that some aspects of the model will remain untestable. On the one hand, the search for a structure-less or assumption-free approach to scientic knowledge is likely to be elusive. At the other extreme, it is hard to accept a study where all the results are driven purely by the structure, and not by the variation in the data. Rather, as researchers, we would like to see that the key constructs of the model are identied by some source of variation in the data, and not by unveriable assumptions about unobservables or functional form (for more on nonparametric identication, see Misra 2011, accompanying article). Our view is that we should be more worried about unveriable assumptions on unobservables, than about testable functional-form specications about observables. The treatment of unobservables drives empirical work, and should not be treated merely as error components or nuisance terms. An important trend in the empirical Marketing literature is a burgeoning set of applications that leverage better and more detailed data on unobservables in order to improve the credibility of estimates, and to relax several assumptions. The new direction is in the best tradition of Marketing: obtaining direct data on aspects that underpin model structure. With the increasing availability of better data, it is clear the growth in this empirical literature will be exciting. Mitigating potential confounds can enable marketers to better pin down consumer preferences and sensitivities to marketing activities which in turn allows for more ecient and eective use of marketing resources. The availability of large data sets is also spurring interest in the use of nonparametric approaches to demand analysis. In data-rich situations, these enable relaxing parametric assumptions to exibly measure marketing-mix eects and to conduct inference. In models of discrete-choice, one has to make a conceptual distinction between a nonparametric specication of the choice-specic indirect utilities and the random utility components, versus a nonparametric specication of the distribution of het-erogeneity. It is rarely possible to achieve nonparametric identication of all three.
13 When one of these components is parametrically specied, the model is referred to as semiparametric. In Mar 
Conclusions
This paper has discussed empirical models of consumer behavior in Marketing. We hope our discussion
(1) has reiterated that the state of the demand analysis enterprise in Marketing is strong and it is an exciting time to be doing empirical work in the eld; (2) has pointed out how empirical research continues to forge a closer connection with the theory, and the theory work in the eld continues to more closely be motivated by and connected to the richness of empirical models; and, (3)encourages researchers to do empirical work with (a) well-articulated goals, (b) clear identication, and, (c) a tight and transparent link to a model of underlying behavior that realistically and exibly describes the process generating the demand data.
13 The conditions for the joint nonparametric identication of the indirect-utilities, the distribution of random-utility errors and of unobserved heterogeneity are stringent, and discussed in Briesch et al. (2010) . Most importantly, we need a choice-specic special regressor to enter the indirect utilities additively with a known coecient; and the indirect utilities to be known a priori at some vector of observed choice-characteristics.
